A
recent decision of Palmer J the New South Wales Supreme Court
in Lewis & Anor v. Doran & Ors [2004] NSW SC608 considered
whether the definition of insolvency which now appears in Section
95A of the Corporations Act has changed the pre-existing law
arising out of cases such as Sandell v Porter (1966) 115
CLR 666. Section 95A is as follows:
95A(1) A person is solvent if, and only if, the person is
able to pay all the person's debts, as and when they fall due
and payable.
95A(2) A person who is not solvent is insolvent.
The case concerned a proceeding brought by the liquidator
of Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) against various
entities, including the directors, for breaching fiduciary
and statutory duties to the company and entering into an uncommercial
transaction under Section 588FA of the Corporations Act. The
Court was asked to consider whether the company was insolvent
at the time the directors entered into the transaction in question
or whether the transaction caused the company to become insolvent.
In considering s95A of the Act, Palmer J discussed the decision
in Sandell v Porter in which the High Court held that a debtor's
ability to pay "from his own moneys", as required
by Section 95 of the Bankruptcy Act, included an ability to
raise money by sale, pledge or mortgage of his assets. That
decision being consistent with earlier authorities concerned
with definitions of insolvency which were dependent upon a
debtor's ability to pay "from his own moneys".
His Honour considered that the question of a company's solvency
may arise retrospectively or prospectively. For example, a
question may arise retrospectively where a liquidator is seeking
to recover an unfair preference or to set aside an insolvent
transaction so that the issue is solvency as at a date prior
to the winding up.
The question may arise prospectively where a company is sought
to be wound up in insolvency and the company's ability to pay
its debts must be determined not only by reference to debts
payable as at the date of the application for winding up, but
also by reference to the company's ability to pay its debts
which will be due for payment sometime in the near future.
Where the Court is considering retrospective insolvency, the
Court has the benefit of hindsight which makes the task of
assessing insolvency as at an alleged date less difficult.
Where there is a question of prospective insolvency, the Court's
task is more difficult, particularly in cases where a company
alleges that it will be able to pay its debts only because
it claims to have access to funds that a third party is said
to be willing to lend without security. In these cases, the
Court must speculate that the third party will lend the funds
as promised and not change its mind at some future time.
In such circumstances, and applying the Sandell v Porter definition
of insolvency, a company would be held to be insolvent as it
would not be meeting its debts "from its own moneys" by
raising funds to meet its debts by sale, pledge or mortgage
of its assets, but rather by an unsecured loan.
Applying the Section 95A definition, Palmer J held that "…the
section can work effectively as a definition of both retrospective
and prospective insolvency if it is shorn of a gloss derived
from the words "from its own moneys". The words "from
its own moneys" have acquired a "gloss" in previous
decisions that has attached a requirement that money obtained
by unsecured borrowings is not treated as the debtor's "own
money".
Palmer J went on to suggest that the words "from its
own moneys" have been deliberately omitted from the s95A
definition, and if the gloss which they acquired in previous
decisions is applied to questions of retrospective insolvency,
the definition can operate to produce a commercially unrealistic,
if not obscured, result.
For those reasons, Palmer J concluded that s95A of the Act
has changed the pre-existing law as to the definition of insolvency
as stated in cases such as Sandell v Porter. He held that it
is no longer necessary in order to assess solvency to ascertain
whether the company is able to pay all of its debts "from
its own moneys" in the sense that unsecured borrowings
are not able to be treated as the debtor's "own money".
Palmer J went on to suggest that "…in my opinion,
s95A requires the Court to decide whether the company is able,
as at the alleged date of insolvency, to pay all its debts
as they become payable by reference to the commercial realities.
If the Court is satisfied that as a matter of commercial reality
the company has a resource available to pay all of its debts
as they become payable, then it will not matter that the resource
is an unsecured borrowing or a voluntary extension of credit
by another party"
|